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Abstract
In response to van Waarden’s paper, which denied the possibility of horizontal tolerance between citi-
zens, I argue that tolerance is both possible and often desirable between citizens. I also argue that a 
more substantive set of constraints are required for justice to be served than mere deference to what-
ever existing constitutions and laws happen to demand. Furthermore, where van Waarden suggested 
that politics consists of “a process of negotiating, bargaining, and compromising among groups with 
conflicting interests,” it is hard to see how this vision could motivate any educational intervention to 
promote people’s abilities to speak up for themselves. Put starkly: it is not at all clear why anyone has 
reason to educate others to potentially outlaw their own way of life on their understanding. I urge 
instead that the attitude of tolerance be promoted on both Rawlsian and Millian grounds. 
This article is in response to 
Van Waarden, B. (2017). Pluralist Liberal Democracies. Democracy & Education, 25(1), Article 1. 
Available at: http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol25/iss1/1
Van Waarden (2017) argued that education for tolerance (or toleration) would be well served by cultivating mutual respect among citizens, 
promoting knowledge of and respect for citizens’ constitutional 
rights, developing students’ democratic participatory skills, 
providing a basic understanding of others’ worldviews, and 
advancing critical media skills. These educational aims, he argued, 
will enable different adherents of a wide variety of deeply contrast-
ing life modes to coexist peacefully. However, the title of his paper 
seems something of a misnomer. Van Waarden did not think that 
one strictly can educate for tolerance since on his understanding, 
tolerance is not possible for citizens. In effect, he said, teach for 
mutual respect between citizens, and tolerance will take care of 
itself. In response, I argue that tolerance is possible and often 
desirable among citizens. I also argue that a more substantive set  
of constraints are required for justice to be served than mere 
deference to whatever existing constitutions and laws happen to 
prescribe. Furthermore, where van Waarden suggested that 
politics consists of “a process of negotiating, bargaining, and 
compromising among groups with conflicting interests”  
(van Waarden, 2017, p. 7), I raise a worry about how this vision 
could possibly motivate any educational intervention to promote 
people’s abilities to speak up for themselves. Put starkly: it is not at 
all clear why anyone has reason to educate others to potentially 
outlaw their own way of life.
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Defining Tolerance
For van Waarden (2017), governments and laws can be more or 
less tolerant of life modes and practices, and schools can teach 
children to engage with public policy and law making in order to 
exercise some (indirect) control over what is and what is not 
tolerated by policy and legislation. Citizens themselves, however, 
have no scope for direct tolerance of one another’s life modes and 
practices. Van Waarden understood tolerance as “consciously 
refraining from the action of rejecting a belief or practice despite 
disapproving of it and having the power to prevent or stop it”  
(p. 3). “Rejection,” van Waarden continued, “means to prevent or 
eliminate the practice. Normally, we accept what we agree with and 
reject what we disagree with” (p. 3). Rejection is an odd choice of 
word to signify the prevention or elimination of a belief or 
practice. After all, in ordinary parlance, it is quite usual to speak of 
rejecting all sorts of beliefs and practices without aiming to 
eliminate or prevent them. Indeed, according to van Waarden, 
Galston “rejected” the idea “that toleration demands autonomy to 
reflect on other life modes” (p. 2), but surely Galston was in no 
position to prevent or eliminate this belief. These examples from 
the author’s own hand go to show how hard it is to adopt this 
artificial use of “rejection.” More significantly, however, contend-
ing that only those who have the power to prevent or eliminate a 
practice are capable of tolerating it is too stringent a condition for 
any recognizable form of the concept.
According to van Waarden (2017), tolerance is not a horizon-
tal feature of societies but only a vertical one: Only laws can be 
tolerant, not citizens. On this view, racists, anti- Semites, and others 
are neither tolerant nor intolerant. That is a peculiar conclusion. 
That would suggest that members of the LGBT community, 
religious, ethnic, and racial minorities, and others in the United 
States and elsewhere are never the objects of intolerance just so 
long as no law proscribes their life modes. However, there are cases 
where the law is ignored by the people, or often ineffectual, so that 
social ostracism is the arbiter. In India, laws against honor killings 
have sadly counted within the set of laws ignored, and those things 
that honor killings punish are often effectively prevented by 
standards outside of the law. Furthermore, governments, laws, and 
police forces can prevent very little indeed: Drug trafficking, 
murder, and robbery would continue despite governments doing 
everything that they could to prevent them. Since no practice is 
eliminable de facto, it would follow that tolerance is impossible in 
practice. Consider the case of radical Islamists who cannot really 
make any change to the way secular Westerners go about their 
daily lives. It seems natural to say that they are intolerant of secular 
Westerners’ life modes, since they are willing to blow themselves 
and secular Westerners up rather than do nothing or ignore them. 
All the same, such violent actions will predictably fail to change 
secular Westerners’ life modes. More nobly perhaps, consider 
whether Thích Quảng Đức’s act of self- immolation to protest the 
persecution of Buddhists by the South Vietnamese government 
could be said to have been neither tolerant of the practice nor 
intolerant of it. Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that if they were 
to move away from places where those things are practiced, that 
too would be a failure of tolerance.
A More Adequate Definition
A more adequate definition of intolerance might require strong 
disapproval of some candidate toward which we can demonstrate 
tolerance, some practice, say, together with the power to exercise 
some sanctions and leverage against that candidate; if not to 
prevent it, then to reduce it, or to make it more difficult to pursue. 
This might well be a property had more by groups than by indi-
viduals. There are other reasons to think that van Waarden’s (2017) 
definition is too stringent. On this weaker and more realistic 
understanding we should acknowledge that even citizens can do 
something to prevent what they disapprove of: They can make it 
very unattractive for others to continue their practices by enacting 
penalties. If a Black man dates a White woman, his racist neighbors 
might beat him up, throw paint on his house, or make up a reason 
to get him fired from work. These things are certainly not legal, but 
if the law is ineffective to prevent them, which it may sometimes 
be, then we can see that tolerance can be possible and morally 
required at the horizontal level. It was not legal to kill Black people, 
to hang them from trees and other such horrendous acts, yet 
people did it in the Southern states. It is not legal to beat up 
children in the school playground if they present as another gender 
than that assigned at birth, but it happens and can go unpunished. 
Teaching for tolerance might mitigate these evils. But horizontal 
intolerance need not take such vicious, violent and terrible forms, 
it may not conflict with any laws at all, and indeed ought not to 
conflict with any laws.
Perceptively, van Waarden (2017) acknowledged that
“public opinion” could influence what is tolerated or rejected between 
citizens (Jones, 2010, pp. 44– 45). Groups of citizens may ostracize 
individuals whose life mode they reject (a Hindu student in India 
might invite all her Hindu classmates to her birthday party but not the 
only two Muslim classmates). (p. 4)
Indeed, later in the paper, van Waarden (2017) began to concede 
these sorts of points on a horizontal level:
Citizens must make complex evaluations of toleration in their daily 
interactions. For example, when a Catholic student encounters a 
Muslim fellow student wearing a niqab on the school bus or sees a 
gay couple holding hands at her high school, she has to judge whether 
to tolerate the practices of wearing a veil or displaying homosexuality 
(p. 3)
But van Waarden (2017) failed to give public opinion and 
social ostracism and other phenomena their due weight:
“Even when a citizen evaluates others’ practices, she still has little 
power to reject them. In a liberal democracy, the state has a monopoly 
on the means to punish intolerable practices.” (p. 4)
To van Waarden, these are “minor means” offering “little power” 
(p. 4) to citizens by way of preventing or eliminating particular life 
modes. This appears to be a strategic and massive underapprecia-
tion, since they can certainly make particular life modes much 
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more unpleasant to pursue. More adequate is Mill’s (2011) account 
of these phenomena:
Society is itself the tyrant— society collectively, over the separate 
individuals who compose it— its means of tyrannising are not 
restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political 
functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it 
issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in 
things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny 
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, 
though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer 
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, 
and enslaving the soul itself. (p. 14)
Van Waarden (2017) wrote that “Normally, we accept what we 
agree with and reject what we disagree with,” where reject means 
“prevent or eliminate the practice.” (p. 3). If “what disagree with” is 
read to mean something much stronger than mere disagreement 
would imply, it is perhaps true that this is indeed what normally 
happens, but that said, there are powerful Millian and Rawlsian 
arguments which should motivate the powerful to show tolerance. 
Furthermore, on the more permissive understanding of tolerance 
that we have elaborated above, we can see that some organizations 
might tolerate each other for pragmatic reasons, such as the 
avoidance of a yet more intolerable fate of mutually assured 
destruction or diminishment. That is, incidentally, a highly 
horizontal plane on which tolerance exists.
Van Waarden (2017) contended that “we cannot tolerate 
everything that we do not accept: certain beliefs, or the practices 
that result from them, are simply wrong. As we have no moral or 
pragmatic reason to tolerate them nevertheless, we reject them” (p. 
3). Here the contention seems to be that anything that we do not 
think is morally acceptable should be done on pain of legal 
sanctions. But this seems overly harsh: one can easily regard 
something as morally wrong without thinking that it ought to be 
penalized with legal sanctions: adultery, apostasy, and heresy 
might be reasonable examples of this. On Millian and Rawlsian 
views, for instance, we all have reason to allow that these things 
should be legally permissible, even if we have moral grounds to 
object to them. Mill further argued that we also have reason to 
resist exercising some forms of social ostracization against these 
practices.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on van Waarden’s (2017) worries 
about asymmetrical tolerance:
This asymmetrical toleration is arguably making Muslims decreasingly 
tolerant of non- Muslim symbols, and so a downward spiral of 
intoleration emerges, in which citizens no longer tolerate other life 
modes and merely try to promote their own. (p. 5)
However, on van Waarden’s (2017) understanding of tolerance, if 
there are more Muslims than Christians, the Christians simply 
would not be in a position to prevent Muslim practices and 
therefore could not be in a position to reciprocate tolerance.  
That is to say, there could never be any question of symmetry or 
asymmetry in tolerance since on van Waarden’s account, tolerance 
requires a monopoly of power.1
Recognition Respect and Tolerance
Instead of tolerance, van Waarden (2017) wanted legally enforced 
recognition respect to do all the work that need be done for 
relations between citizens: “liberalism attempts to accommodate 
diversity by encouraging citizens to separate their private and 
public identities” and “once we separate public and private identi-
ties, we assign a basic respect to the public side of citizens” (p. 4). 
However, while liberal democracies might distinguish between 
private and public identities, this is no reason to think that citizens 
in general do, especially not those unenamoured with liberal 
democracy.
Rooted in the notion of recognition respect, there seems to be 
the idea of hating the sin and not the sinner. But if one despises 
another’s very way of life, it is hard not to let that effect one’s 
judgement and treatment of them. All the same, in some instances 
(to a first approximation, those in which no harm is done to 
others), it is worth counseling tolerance of what one despises: for 
the familiar Rawlsian reason that, from behind a veil of ignorance, 
we would want to have the freedom to live in accord with our 
conscience even if that makes us unpopular with others. It is also 
worth counseling tolerance for the familiar Millian reason that 
nobody has a monopoly on truth, and that, for all one knows, those 
whom one despises might have understood matters aright after all. 
Van Waarden (2017) at one point acknowledged the harm principle 
as normatively important, but only fleetingly: Van Waarden 
seemed to not have very much to say prescriptively, but offered 
more description of processes. What is tolerable or intolerable is to 
be decided by individuals by whatever standards they happen to 
think in terms of, and then in a liberal democracy there happens to 
be a procedure by which they can jostle to have what they consider 
intolerable restricted by law. Van Waarden has not contributed 
much if anything to the question of what should be tolerated and  
if so, why, which would seem to be the more pressing normative 
question.
To return to the relation between tolerance and respect, the 
switch from the former to the latter might seem rather shallow. It 
seems rather odd to expect that people who are despised in their 
private lives will be respected in their public lives by those who 
despise them. Van Waarden (2017) would prefer that “schools . . . 
teach students the merits of minimal civil respect for others”  
(p. TK). But this might simply amount to tolerance by another 
name. Furthermore, if education is required to encourage such 
respect rather than mere legal penalties to enforce them, it seems 
that we have again acknowledged that we are covertly acknowledg-
ing horizontal planes of tolerance. “The main point here is that, 
because respect is the primary means to enabling peaceful 
1 I would like to express thanks to an anonymous reviewer who pointed 
out that I here equate numerical majority with power, and reminded me 
of many obvious counter examples. I ask only that in the hypothetical 
case under consideration here, numerical majority is enough to grant 
power.
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coexistence among citizens and these citizens have little power to 
reject practices, toleration plays only a minor role in the horizontal 
relation among them.” (p. 5). In sum, it seems doubtful that people 
have enough power to flout recognition but not to exercise 
intolerance.
It seems rather difficult to counsel people that they should be 
black, gay, and religious in their private lives, but not to bring those 
identities into the public arena. How is a person to avoid embody-
ing their gay or straight identity, or any other identity, in their most 
uncontroversially public roles, such as being a public school 
teacher or government official? Just as strange is the following 
prescription amounting to the demand that people not be religious 
really, not letting their deepest commitments integrate fully across 
their lives: “Religious people must try to limit the influence of their 
beliefs on their interactions with other citizens and respect others 
based on their shared citizenship” (van Waarden, 2017, p. 4). It is 
especially peculiar when you want to ensure that a range of 
reasonable ways of life are available to pursue. Furthermore, when 
van Waarden (2017) said that “public interaction is guided by a 
shared political identity” (p. 3), this would seem to imply the need 
to educate for a shared political identity, an identity that some may 
reject and inculcation into which some would regard as an 
indoctrinatory process. It is hard to see how this is any kind of an 
improvement on educating others to tolerate one another’s 
lifestyles or how this avoids the strong and apparently illiberal 
move of narrowing the range of life modes and comprehensive 
ideals that are compatible with liberal democracy.
According to van Waarden (2017), Darwall’s concept of 
“appraisal respect” and Gutmann and Thompson’s concept of 
“mutual respect” are unrealistic and “based on the unwarranted 
assumption that common civic life is about groups coming 
together morally rather than negotiating politically” (p. 4). But this 
seems unduly pessimistic. Surely different groups often agree on 
things (e.g., that they should stop Nazis killing Jews, or should stop 
Nazis rampaging over Europe). Indeed, from outside the African 
American community, support for the civil rights movement came 
more from people who sympathized with African Americans than 
from those who thought that the civil rights movement somehow 
enhanced their own prospects. On  
van Waarden’s account different factions are able respect  
each other as rights holders without being minded to tolerate each 
other’s most fundamental commitments, even respecting their 
exercise of those legal rights that they regard one another as not 
really having by absolute moral standards (e.g., the right to engage 
in gay sex). Different factions must jostle though, to have their own 
moral visions constrict one another’s legal rights, rather than be 
persuaded by any arguments that they can have a shared goal or 
should, in Millian fashion, err on the side of permissiveness when 
restricting liberties. Indeed, such a deeply divided society begins to 
sound like a Hobbesian state of nature in need of government to 
keep all sides form destroying each other— except that it would 
have the interesting twist that the state of nature was not so bad 
anyway since nobody was able to interfere with each other’s 
practices anyway. Perhaps establishing a government is the 
sacrifice they would make in order to practice intolerance. Perhaps 
this is a genuine worst- case scenario, but it is hardly always or even 
usually true of most people. Perhaps however, there are some 
among whom it is usually the case that this is the best we can expect 
of them, and it is then desirable as a fall- back position in their 
cases. All the same, promoting a shared political identity and 
dispositions to respect all as citizens may require a substantive 
education contrary to the wishes of those citizens.
It is an interesting question as to how far governments can 
enforce recognition respect through legislation. Van Waarden 
(2017) gave the example of the Dutch liberal democratic state 
taking the step to mandate that a political party allow female 
citizens to be eligible for election, an action “guaranteeing that 
citizens in their public interactions would continue to respect each 
other unconditionally as political equals” (p. 4). Whether such a 
guarantee has been made is dubious.
Such mandates can be made, but party members might refuse 
to vote for women or nominate women for leadership roles even 
still. In such a case, the recognition respect would exist only on 
paper. It requires shifts of attitudes to effect genuine recognition 
respect.
The Law and Tolerance
Van Waarden (2017) contended that “laws only indicate the outer 
boundary of toleration between the zones of tolerable and reject-
able practices, not the inner boundary between tolerable and 
unobjectionable practices” (p. 6). This is too binary a picture, 
however: There are different levels of penalty for different crimes, 
reflecting different degrees of toleration (or intolerance). 
Furthermore, governments can incentivize some practices and 
give legal protections such as spousal testimonial privilege, which 
shows some special regard for the institution of marriage.
According to van Waarden (2017), politics is “a process of 
negotiating, bargaining, and compromising among groups with 
conflicting interests” (p. 7), which apparently entails that “partici-
patory skills are no luxury, but essential to the survival of a citizen’s 
life mode and, indirectly, liberal democracy itself ” (p. 7). However, 
it is hard to see how this motivates any educational intervention to 
promote people’s abilities to speak up for themselves. If all that 
motivates people is a concern to see those things that they object to 
ruled out by law, it is hard to see why they would then want to equip 
others with the wherewithal to prevent such legislation being 
enacted, or enact such legislation against them. What reason could 
anyone have to educate others to potentially outlaw their own way 
of life? Van Waarden claimed that “citizens require “preventive” 
participatory skills when they form the majority but need to 
prevent intoleration of minority practices.” But on van Waarden’s 
own account, it is hard to see why they require these, or what 
should motivate principled tolerance (something like Mill’s harm 
principle could come into play here); after all, so far, we have just 
been treated to the idea that politics consists of seeing what one 
objects to legislated against (and preserving the legality of one’s 
own mode of living). If there is such a thing as due process or ideal 
bargaining conditions or some kind of procedure by which those 
who are ruled out are justly ruled out, then that could very much 
more be brought to the fore.
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Van Waarden also insisted that “schools should teach 
students [about] liberal democracy’s constitutional rights, 
which limit the scope of decisions of toleration” (p. 9). One 
important response to make to this is that not all liberal democ-
racies have constitutions; for instance, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Israel, and New Zealand do 
not. The second is that simply because some rules have been 
codified in a constitution does not seem to render them just, 
and unjust constitutions ought to be revised. What might be 
needed again is some sense of what constraints there ought to  
be on constitutions either in the procedure of being drawn up  
or in their potential content.
A Reasonable Diversity of Ways of Life
The key normative constraint proposed by the essay is just this: 
Whatever system we have, it should be one that enables a reason-
able diversity of life modes. But it is not clear to me that the author 
has succeeded in describing a form of education that will enable 
the perpetuation of a reasonable diversity of ways of life, or even the 
preservation of constitutions. This is because, by following the 
political process of using democratic procedures to implement 
rules that prohibit those life modes that one takes to be intoler-
able, a society may become highly homogenous. What are 
perhaps needed are rules of the Millian or Rawlsian sort, which 
limit those things which can be legally restricted.
Conclusion
I hope to have shown that tolerance is a possible attitude among 
citizens, and that it is often, although by no means always, a 
desirable attitude. I have also argued that a more substantive set of 
constraints are required for justice to be served than mere defer-
ence to whatever constitutions and laws happen to demand. 
Furthermore, where van Waarden (2017) suggested that politics 
consists in “a process of negotiating, bargaining, and compromis-
ing among groups with conflicting interests” (p. 7), it is hard to see 
how this vision could motivate any general educational interven-
tion to promote people’s abilities to ensure the legality their own, 
potentially intolerable, ways of life and, potentially, the illegality of 
one’s own tolerable way of life. Put starkly: it is not at all clear on 
this view why anyone has reason to empower others to potentially 
outlaw their own way of life. I would urge that the attitude of 
tolerance be promoted on both Rawlsian and Millian grounds and, 
admittedly very vaguely, gesture back to Mill’s harm principle for a 
rough guide to what ought to be tolerated within both horizontal 
and vertical power relations.
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